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TACTICS IN UN SECURITY COUNCIL

There are two and sharply different tactics we can use:

1. Propose a broad political program for the demilitarization of Cuba: The components would be (a) stop all foreign military build up, (b) dismantle and evacuate all foreign military installations, (c) guarantee integrity of Cuba, (d) UN observer force, and (e) end the blockade.

2. Propose simply a military standstill in Cuba, supervised by UN.

The first has the disadvantage of pledging our withdrawal from Guantanamo, *as the Cuban Government* if and when Soviet military are withdrawn and Soviet missiles and aircraft dismantled or neutralized. It has, however, the following important advantages:

1. The single act of the week which will have most impact on world opinion and arouse most fears of immediate war, despite our efforts to concentrate attention on the Soviet missile sites, will be our naval blockade. In order to obtain the broad political support which we need in this crisis, we should have a broad political program which will cover our military action by demonstrating our genuine willingness to remove all foreign military presence from Cuba.

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- 2 -

2. In fact, if this proposal should be accepted and carried out, the Soviets would have lost an important military asset in Cuba, while we would have lost a base which is of little use to us. This would be a major victory, not a defeat.

3. If we demand merely that the Soviets get out of Cuba, it will be widely alleged we are seeking uncompensated military and political advantage at serious risk to world peace, and we will obtain little support, ~~even from our allies.~~ In the UN we risk failure to hold the seven votes we need in the SC, not to mention the two-thirds we ~~are~~ may need ~~next~~ in the GA.

(A possible alternative to the offer to withdraw from Cuba would be an offer to evacuate our missiles from Turkey and Italy. This would be less desirable because (a) our missiles in these countries could be a very important bargaining counter at the Summit meeting and should not be thrown away in advance, (b) the effect in Turkey, particularly if there is not careful advance preparation, might be very serious.)

The second tactic for the SC, proposal of a military "standstill", is the best approach if it is judged ~~insufficient~~ inexpedient even implicitly to offer the evacuation of Guantanamo at this time. This tactic, however, will fail to divert world attention from a military action, will obtain far less ~~more~~ political support, will ~~probably~~ be no more acceptable

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~~TOP SECRET~~

- 3 -

to the Soviets than the broader approach~~since~~ since it also would establish a UN presence at their missile sites, and would run the further risk of being twisted in the Council to ^{our} apply an immediate "standstill" to ~~any~~ blockade. This tactic would, in effect, delay any political program until the Summit meeting.

The first alternative, therefore, seems very much to be preferred.

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